crash sense

which I interpreted to be inverter stoppage. However, there was no indication on the enunciator panel.

"I slipped my hand against the circuit breaker panel and looked to see if any circuit breakers were out, at the same time turning the aircraft toward the airfield. At this point, I looked at my engine instruments and saw both torque pressures fall to zero. I also noticed that the warning flags on the FC 105 were out. I called the tower, reported electrical failure, placed the inverter switch to emergency, saw that both N_1 readings were about 60 percent, added power and watched both N_1 readings jump to 80 percent, then fall to zero.

"At this point, I declared an emergency, turned away from the airfield toward a wooded area in the populated area. I signaled the observer to eject and began putting switches on the left eyebrow panel in the emergency position. When I was sure the aircraft would fall into the wooded area, I pulled back the power levers and ejected.

"After regaining consciousness, I looked down and saw the aircraft crash in the woods. I landed in a tree about 50 yards from the wreckage."

Both engines were sent to a laboratory for teardown analysis to determine the cause of simultaneous failure. Here are the conclusions of this analysis: "Engine failure and loss of electrical power were caused by flameouts induced by the excessive amounts of contamination (water) noted in the fuel samples that were drawn from the fuel controls during engine disassembly. The chlorine traces found in the samples indicate that the water had been treated for drinking purposes."

The laboratory recommended that petroleum servicing personnel should be shown the Air Force training film, TF 1-5345, "Fuel Contamination—Jet Age Killer." This film covers the steps to be taken and procedures to be followed at base level in the control and handling of aircraft fuel.

OV-1 EJECTION

The pilot: "Our mission was to photograph bridge sites along the river. We completed the mission approximately 1205 hours and proceeded back to the airfield to refuel and reload the camera for another mission.

"I called the tower for landing instructions and was cleared to left base for runway 27, to report 2 miles left base with gear. While the tower operator was giving these instructions, I throttled back to approximately 30 pounds of torque pressure, placed the aircraft in a descending pitch attitude, and turned right about 30° to set up my position for a left base. After passing 2,000 feet indicated, I brought the nose up to a cruise pitch attitude to decrease the rate of descent and airspeed. Before reaching 1,600 feet, I heard a click, followed immediately by the continually decreased pitch of the hum in my ears caused by the running aircraft

OV-1 loss caused by water in fuel

crash sense

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U-6A SUCKER HOLE

The pilot: "I experienced a wedging effect from the ceiling tops, requiring me to climb to 9,500 feet to remain VFR on top. After reaching 9,500 feet, I still had to climb and I elected to tune in a command post nondirectional beacon and request an IFR control clearance direct to the command post. I was unable to read approach control and my instructions were relayed by a U-8 aircraft to descend to 6,000 feet, cleared direct to the command post. After starting the descent and going IFR, the U-8 aircraft relayed instructions from approach control to climb back to 9,500 feet and remain VFR on top. I immediately started to climb.

"Passing through 9,500, still IFR, with no definite VFR indications, I requested clearance back to the command post. I was now able to receive approach control, but unable to transmit clearly to them. Approach control cleared me to 7,000 feet, direct to the command post. After proceeding at 7,000 feet for approximately 40 minutes, approach control again contacted me for an estimate of my arrival and assured me of above ADF minimums. Our contact was now loud and clear both ways. The weather was given as 3,000 feet broken, visibility 3 miles in haze and light snow, with improving conditions.

"After proceeding for approximately seven more minutes, I encountered VFR conditions with a large hole for a possible VFR letdown. I recognized the surrounding terrain as an area approximately 25 miles east of my destination. I cancelled IFR and informed approach control of my approximate position. They acknowledged and informed me to contact the tower.

"After descending VFR to 1,800 feet, I proceeded west along the river. At this time I encountered almost zero visibility and a rapidly decreasing ceiling in a moderate snow and sleet shower. I immediately turned 180°. I proceeded east along the river and again encountered a zero visibility condition, which by this time had completely engulfed the valley.

"I chose an emergency landing area and circled it once, preparing for an emergency landing. I